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One approach to urban areas emphasizes the existence of certain immutable relationships, such as
Zipf’s or Gibrat’s Law. An alternative view is that urban change reflects individual responses to changing
tastes or technologies. This paper examines almost 200 years of regional change in the U.S. and finds
that few, if any, growth relationships remain constant, including Gibrat’s Law. Education does a reasonable
job of explaining urban resilience in recent decades, but does not seem to predict county growth a
century ago. After reviewing this evidence, we present and estimate a simple model of regional change,
where education increases the level of entrepreneurship. Human capital spillovers occur at the city
level because skilled workers produce more product varieties and thereby increase labor demand. We
find that skills are associated with growth in productivity or entrepreneurship, not with growth in quality
of life, at least outside of the West. We also find that skills seem to have depressed housing supply
growth in the West, but not in other regions, which supports the view that educated residents in that
region have fought for tougher land-use controls. We also present evidence that skills have had a disproportionately
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Are there universal laws of urban and regional population growth that hold over centuries,
or do time-speci￿c shifts in tastes and technology drive the shifts of population over space?
Is urban change better understood with the tools of physics or a knowledge of history? In
this paper, we investigate patterns of population and income change over the long run in the
older regions of the U.S. Within this large land mass, there has been remarkable persistence
in population levels across time. The logarithm of county population in 2000 rises almost
perfectly one-for-one with the logarithm of population in 1860 and the correlation between
the two variables is 66 percent.
Formal modeling of city growth has naturally tended to focus on patterns that are pre-
sumed to hold universally, such as Gibrat￿ s law, which claims that population growth rates
are independent of initial levels. Gibrat￿ s law has received a great deal of recent interest be-
cause of its connection with Zipf￿ s law, the claim that the size distribution of cities in most
countries is well approximated by a Pareto distribution (Gabaix 1999, Gabaix and Ioannides
2004, Eeckhout, 2004).1 Our paper is not concerned with static laws of urban size, such as
Zipf￿ s law, but rather with the permanence of dynamic relationships.
The long-run persistence of county level populations implies that Gibrat￿ s law has very
much held in the long run. But Gibrat￿ s law doesn￿ t hold reliably for county population
changes at higher frequencies. Before 1860 and after 1970, less populous counties grew
more quickly. During the intervening decades, when America industrialized and sectors
concentrated to exploit returns to scale (Kim 2006), population growth was regularly faster
in more populated areas. One interpretation is that Gibrat￿ s law is universal, but only over
su¢ ciently long time periods. An equally plausible interpretation is that Gibrat￿ s law holds
in the long run because of the accidental balancing of centripetal forces, which dominated
during the industrial era, and centrifugal forces, which have become more powerful in the
age of the car and the truck; and that￿ as a result￿ there is no reason to expect the law to
hold in the future.
Geographic variables also wax and wane in importance. During recent decades, January
temperature has been a reliable predictor of urban growth, and that was also true in the
late 19th century; but it wasn￿ t true either before 1860 or in the early decades of the 20th
century. The Great Lakes seem to have attracted population both in the early years of
the American Republic, and also during a second wave of growth in the ￿rst half of the
1Another strand of the literature has expanded the standard theory of endogenous growth to incorporate
urban dynamics and reconcile increasing returns at the local level with constant returns and a balanced
growth path for the aggregate economy (Eaton and Eckstein 1997; Black and Henderson 1999; Duranton
2006, 2007; Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007).
220th century, associated with the expansion of industrial cities that formed around earlier
commercial hubs. Population has moved away from these waterways since 1970, even within
the eastern areas of the U.S. To us, these patterns seem to suggest waves of broad regional
change that are associated with tectonic shifts in the economy, rather than time-invariant
laws.
Even schooling has its limits as a predictor of growth. Since 1940, in our sample of
counties, the share of a county￿ s population with college degrees at the start of a decade
predicts population growth in every subsequent decade except the 1970s. Even in the 1970s,
schooling predicts growth among counties with more than 100,000 people. But this fact
does not hold in the West even today, and it doesn￿ t seem to hold during much of the
19th century. While Simon and Nardinelli (2002) document a connection between skilled
occupations and area growth since 1880, we don￿ t ￿nd much of a relationship between the
share of the population with college degrees in 1940 and growth before 1900. Perhaps this
just re￿ ects the fact that we are forced to use an ex post measure of education that may well
be poorly correlated with skills in 1860 or 1880; but it seems as likely that the industrializing
forces of the late 19th century just didn￿ t favor better educated areas.
The one persistent truth about population change in this group of counties is that growth
strongly persists. With the exception of a single decade (the 1870s), the correlation between
population growth in one decade and the lagged value of that variable is never less than .3
and typically closer to .5. Among counties with more than 50,000 people, the correlation
between current and lagged population growth is never less than .4 in any decade. Over
longer seventy-year time periods, however, faster growth in an early period is associated
with lower subsequent growth. These facts are quite compatible with the view that growth
is driven by epoch-speci￿c forces, like large-scale industrialization and the move to car-based
living, that eventually dissipate.
We only have county income data since 1950, and as a result we have little ability to
observe large historic shifts in this variable. In every decade except the 1980s there is strong
mean reversion in this variable; Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) established mean reversion
for state incomes going back to 1840. The connection between income growth and education
or manufacturing has, however, varied from decade to decade. In the 1960s and 1970s,
income growth was positively correlated with income growth during the previous decade,
but that trend reversed after 1980. With the exception of mean reversion, universal laws
about income growth seem no more common than universal laws about population growth.
One interpretation of the collection of facts assembled in Section 2 is that the eastern
United States has experienced three distinct epochs. In the ￿rst 60-odd years of the 19th
century, the population spread out, especially towards colder areas with good soil quality
3and access to waterways. From the late 19th century until the 1950s, America industrialized
and the population clustered more closely together, which set o⁄ a second growth spurt of
the Great Lakes region. Over the past four decades, declining transport costs has led both
to the spread of people across space, towards the Sun Belt, and the increasing success of
skilled, entrepreneurial areas that thrive by producing new ideas. The early period of spatial
concentration of U.S. manufacturing at the beginning of the 20th century and its dispersion
in the last few decades are quite compatible with the work of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg
(2009a, 2009b, 2010), who suggest that innovative new industries cluster to bene￿t from
knowledge spillovers while mature sectors spread out following technology di⁄usion.
After reviewing these stylized facts, in Section 3 we present a model of human capital,
entrepreneurship and urban reinvention. The model is meant to help us understand the
strong connection between human capital and urban reinvention in the post-war period. The
model suggests that the impact of skills on growth will di⁄er depending on local conditions,
and skills will be particularly valuable in places that are hit with adverse shocks. The model
also suggests a decomposition that enables us to understand the channels through which
human capital impacts on growth.
Skilled cities may grow because of faster productivity growth, perhaps due to greater
entrepreneurship, as emphasized by our theory. They may also grow because of an expanding
supply of housing, and Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2006) found that human capital may
predict increases in either the quantity or the price of housing, depending on the local
regulatory environment. Finally, city growth responds to faster improvement in amenities,
which skilled residents could induce through their demand as consumers and voters (Shapiro
2006). In Section 4, we use data on population growth, income growth and changes in
housing values to estimate the extent of the power of these di⁄erent forces. We ￿nd that
the growth of skilled cities generally re￿ ects growth in productivity rather than growth in
amenities. The connection between growth and productivity seems strongest in the South
and least strong in the West. The West is the only regions where skills are associated with
increases in the quality of life. We also ￿nd that in the West, more skilled areas have had
less housing supply growth, which may re￿ ect that tendency of skilled people to organize to
block new construction. We also try to separate out total productivity growth into growth
in the number of employers and growth in the per-employer average productivity. We ￿nd
that skills are more strongly correlated with growth in per-employer average productivity.
Section 5 turns to the connection between skills and urban resilience during the current
recession. We look at the strong negative connection between skills and unemployment
and ￿nd that this connection is larger than would be predicted solely on the basis of the
cross-sectional relationship between education levels and unemployment rates. This fact
4is additional evidence for human capital spillovers at the city level, which may re￿ ect the
entrepreneurial tendencies of the more skilled. Section 6 concludes.
2 Ten Stylized Facts about Regional Decline and Re-
silience
We begin this paper with a broad perspective on urban resilience and change in the older
areas of the United States. Our approach is non-standard. We follow economic historians
such as Kim and Margo (2004) and take a very long perspective, going back, in some cases,
to 1790. This longer perspective then forces us to focus on counties rather than cities or
metropolitan areas. County data is available for long time periods, and while it is possible to
use modern metropolitan de￿nitions to group those counties, we believe that such grouping
introduces a considerable bias into our calculations. Since metropolitan area de￿nitions are
essentially modern, we would be using an outcome to de￿ne our sample, which introduces
bias. Low-population areas in the 19th century would inevitably have to grow unusually
quickly if they were to be populous enough to be counted as metropolitan areas in the 20th
century.
We also include only counties in the eastern and central portions of the United States, to
avoid having our results dominated by the continuing westward tilt of the U.S. population.
The western limit of our data is 90th meridian (west), the location of Memphis, Tennessee:
Mississippi can be thought of as the data￿ s western border. We also exclude those areas that
are south of 30th parallel, which exclude much of Florida and two counties in Louisiana, and
those areas north of the 43rd parallel, which exclude some northern areas of New England
and the Midwest. While we will present data going back to the 1790 Census, we think of this
area as essentially the settled part of the United States at the start of the Civil War, which
allows us to treat the post-1860 patterns as essentially re￿ ecting changes within a settled
area of territory.
In this section, we examine ten stylized facts about regional change using this sample
of counties. These facts inform our later theoretical discussion and may be helpful in other
discussions of urban change. In some cases, these facts are quite similar to facts established
using cities and metropolitan areas, but in other cases the county-level data display their
own idiosyncrasies.
5Fact # 1: Population patterns have been remarkably persistent over long time
periods
Perhaps the most striking fact about this sample of counties is the similarity of population
patterns in 1860 and today. When we regress the logarithm of population in 2000 on the
logarithm of population in 1860, we ￿nd:
log(Pop in 2000) = 1:268 + :996 ￿log(Pop in 1860).
(:32) (:03)
(1)
There are 1124 observations and the R2 is .439, which corresponds to a 66 percent correlation.
Population in 2000 rises essentially one-for-one with population in 1860, as shown in Figure
1. Some persistence is naturally to be expected because the housing stock of a city is durable
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). But our ￿nding implies furthermore that, over this long time
horizon, Gibrat￿ s law operates: the change in population is essentially unrelated to the initial
population level.
If we restrict ourselves to land even further east, using the 80th parallel as the boundary
(about Erie, Pennsylvania), we estimate:
log(Pop in 2000) = ￿:38 + :1:17 ￿log(Pop in 1860).
(:58) (:06)
(10)
In this case, there are only 306 observations, and the R2 rises to .57, which represents a 75
percent correlation between population in 1860 and population in 2000 in this easternmost
part of the U.S. While urban dynamics in America often seem quite volatile, there is a
great deal of permanence in this older region. In this sample, there is a positive correlation
between initial population levels and the rate of subsequent population growth, suggesting
a tendency towards increased concentration.
Fact # 2: Population growth persists over short periods but not long periods
The permanence of population levels is accompanied by a remarkable permanence of pop-
ulation growth rates over shorter time periods. The ￿rst two columns of Table 1 show the
correlation of population growth rates, measured with the change in the logarithm of popu-
lation, and the lagged value of that variable. The ￿rst column shows results for our entire
sample. The second column shows results when we restrict the sample to include only those
counties that have 50,000 people at the start of the lagged decade.
Column 1 shows that in every decade, except for the 1870s, there is a strong positive
correlation between current and lagged growth rates. Between the 1800s and the 1860s, the
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there is a reversal, but starting in the 1880s, the pattern resumes again: between the 1880s
and the 1940s, the correlation coe¢ cients lie between .30 (the Great Depression decade) and
.50 (the 1910s). During the post-war period, the correlations have been even higher, with
correlation coe¢ cients above .64 in all decades except for the somewhat unusual 1970s.
The pattern of persistence for more populous counties is even stronger. Over the entire
period, the correlation coe¢ cient never drops below .43. Except for the 1950s, the correlation
coe¢ cient is always higher for more populous counties than for smaller ones. The auto-
correlation of growth rates for more populated counties was particularly high during the
decades before the Civil War, when big cities were expanding rapidly in a more or less
parallel path, and during more recent decades.
While short-term persistence is very much the norm for population growth rates, over
longer periods growth rates can be negatively correlated. For the 54 counties that began with
more than 50,000 people in 1860, an extra ten percent growth between 1860 and 1930 was
associated with a lower 2.5 percent growth rate between 1930 and 2000, as shown by Figure 2.
This negative correlation does not exist for the larger sample, but given that the persistence
of decadal growth rates was even stronger among the counties with greater population levels
the reversal is all the more striking. This negative relationship is our ￿rst indication of the
changes in growth patterns over the 1860-2000 period. It suggests that di⁄erent counties
were growing during di⁄erent epochs, and perhaps that fundamentally di⁄erent forces were
at work. We now turn to the relationship between initial population and later population
growth, which is commonly called Gibrat￿ s law.
Fact # 3: Gibrat￿ s law is often broken
In studies of the post-war growth of cities and metropolitan areas, population growth has
typically been found to be essentially uncorrelated with initial population levels both in
the U.S. and elsewhere (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 1995; Eaton and Eckstein 1997;
Glaeser and Shapiro 2003). Gabaix (1999), Eeckhout (2004), and C￿rdoba (2008) have used
this regularity to explain the size distribution of cities. Our long-run population persistence
fact has already shown that Gibrat￿ s law also seems to hold in our sample over su¢ ciently
long time periods. In our entire sample, the correlation between change in log population
between 1860 and 2000 is -.0034 and the estimated coe¢ cient in a regression where change in
the logarithm of population is regressed on the initial logarithm of population is -.0038 with
a standard error of .033. There is also no correlation between the logarithm of population
in 1950 and population change over the 50 years since then.
But Gibrat￿ s law doesn￿ t hold for many decades within our sample. Column 3 of Table
71 shows the correlation between the initial logarithm of population and the subsequent
change in the logarithm of population over the subsequent decade. Column 4 shows the
correlation only for more populous counties, those with at least 50,000 people at the start of
the decade. The table shows that Gibrat￿ s law holds during some time periods, but certainly
not uniformly.
During the 19th century (with the exception of the 1860s), population growth is strongly
negatively associated with initial population levels, especially in places that began with less
people. This period is not marked by Gibrat￿ s law at all￿ it is marked by mean reversion, as
Americans spread out towards less populated counties. This process re￿ ects improvements in
transportation over this time period, and the great demand for newly accessible agricultural
land.
While the entire sample is showing strong mean reversion, during the same period there
is a positive, but usually insigni￿cant, correlation between initial population levels and later
growth in more populous counties. The pattern in this period is perhaps best understood
as two separate processes that are going on simultaneously. Cities are getting bigger, as
America grows, but empty farm areas are also gaining population.
This early period re￿ ects the settlement of the region, and it can be considered anomalous
and unrelated to patterns that should be expected to hold in a more mature area. We
therefore focus more on the 20th century, when the eastern U.S. is more mature; but even
then, Gibrat￿ s law often fails to hold.
From the 1910s through 1960s, there was a long period where Gibrat￿ s law, more or less,
applies for more populated counties, but the larger sample shows faster population growth
in places with higher initial levels of population. The process of centralized big city growth
had become far weaker, but there was more growth in middle-population counties. This also
re￿ ects the relative decline of agriculture during those years and the fact that agriculture
was overrepresented in the least dense counties.
Finally, from 1970 to 2000, the correlations between initial population and later growth
are generally negative, especially in the most populous counties. This presumably re￿ ects
some of the impact of sprawl and the role that the automobile played in dispersing the
American population.
Fact # 4: The 19th century moved west; the 20th century moved east
Just as Gibrat￿ s law is hardly universal, there is also no universal pattern of horizontal
movement within the region we consider. During the 19th century, the norm was to move
west, but that reversed itself during much of the 20th century, within our restricted sample
of counties. We focused on the eastern, central parts of the United States to reduce the
8impact of the enormous changes associated with the move to California and later to Florida.
But that doesn￿ t mean that there wasn￿ t a westward push during much of 19th century.
Table 2 shows the correlation between longitude and population growth by decade across
our sample. Over the entire time period, there is no statistically signi￿cant correlation
between population growth and longitude.
During every decade in the 19th century, growth was faster in the more western counties
in our sample. This connection is strongest before the Civil War, when America is moving
towards the Mississippi, but even as late as the 1890s, there is a weak negative relationship
between longitude and population growth. To us, the more interesting fact is that since 1900,
there is a move back east, at least in this sample. In every decade, except for the 1930s,
longitude positively predicts growth. One interpretation of this fact was that the gains
from populating the Midwest declined substantially after 1900, perhaps because America
had become a less agricultural nation. According to this hypothesis, the eastern counties
grew more quickly because they were better connected with each other and more suitable
for services and manufacturing, and the agricultural communities declined. Since the 1970s,
the connection between population growth and longitude has essentially disappeared.
Fact #5: The Great Lakes region grew during two distinct periods
In the early 19th century, waterways were the lifeline of America￿ s transportation network,
and the Great Lakes were the key arteries for the network. We calculate the distance between
the county center and the center of the nearest Great Lake.2 We then de￿ne proximity to
the Great Lakes as the maximum of 200 minus the distance to the Great Lake centroid or
zero.3
The second column of Table 2 shows the correlation between population growth and this
measure of proximity to these large central bodies of water. Between 1790 and 1870, the
correlation is uniformly positive, ranging from .07 during the 1850s to .44 during the 1810s.
The early 19th century was the period when the Great Lakes had the strongest impact on
population growth, which is not surprising since there were few other workable forms of
internal transportation in the pre-rail era
Between 1870 and 1910, the correlation between proximity to the Great Lakes and growth
is generally negative and quite weak. It turns out that this negative correlation is explained
by the positive relationship between proximity to the Great Lakes and population levels
in 1870 (.28 correlation coe¢ cient). When we control for population in 1870, there is no
2We use ESRI Data & Maps 9.3 for the calculation.
3Unadjusted distance to the Great Lakes is strongly correlated with latitude and with temperature (-.89).
Using a truncated measure, we can better distinguish proximity to the Great Lakes from coldness.
9negative correlation between proximity to the Great Lakes and population growth between
1870 and 1900. Still, the absence of a positive relationship can be seen as an indication that
the growing rail network had made access to waterways far less critical during the latter
years of the 19th century.
Between 1910 and 1960, there is again a positive correlation between proximity to the
Great Lakes and growth. Figure 3 shows the .33 correlation for counties within 200 miles of
the Great Lakes. During this era of industrial growth and declining agricultural populations,
factories grew in cities, like Detroit, that had once been centers of water-borne commerce.
In some cases, the waterways were still important conduits for inputs and outputs. In other
cases, industry located along the Great Lakes because this is where population masses were
already located￿ about 44 percent of the positive correlation disappears when we control for
population in 1910.
After this second surge of Great Lakes population growth, the region declined after 1970.
Many explanations have been given for the decline of the Rust Belt, such as high union
wages and an anti-business political environment (Holmes 1998), a lack of innovation in
places with large plants and little industrial diversity, and the increasing desire to locate
in sunnier climates. Our model below formalizes how technological progress has reduced
the importance of logistical advantage conferred by the Great Lakes, thereby inducing a
population shift towards regions with greater consumption amenities (Glaeser, Kolko, and
Saiz 2001).
Fact # 6: The Sun Belt rose both after 1870 and after 1970
The third column in Table 2 shows the correlation between population growth and January
temperature between 1790 and today. In every decade from the 1790s to the 1860s colder
places show faster growth, as the North was gaining population relative to the South. Several
factors explain this phenomenon. Many Northern areas had better farmland and they had a
denser network of waterways. Industrialization came ￿rst to the North. Some illnesses, like
malaria, were more prevalent in the South. For every extra degree of January temperature,
population growth fell by .038 log points between 1810 and 1860, and by 1860, the correlation
between county population levels and January temperature was -.41.
After the Civil War, the relationship between temperature and population growth re-
versed itself. In every decade from the 1870s to the 1900s, population growth was positively
associated with January temperature. Every extra degree of January temperature was asso-
ciated with .01 log points of growth between 1880 and 1910.4 The e⁄ect of January temper-
ature is strongest in less dense areas and the e⁄ect disappears in more populous counties.
4The 1870 Census is potentially problematic because of an undercount in the South (Farley 2008).
10This may re￿ ect higher fertility among the poorer and less educated Southern population
(Steckel 1978). Increasing rail densities in the South may also have made farming in more
remote areas more attractive.
The relationship between January temperature and population growth then disappears
between 1910 and 1970. The correlation is weak, and if anything negative. Moreover,
it is largely explained by the positive correlation between initial population levels and later
growth: controlling for initial population, the e⁄ect of January temperature on growth during
the entire 1910-1970 time period is indistinguishable from zero. The coe¢ cients become
signi￿cantly positive once we restrict the sample to counties with more than 50,000 people
in 1910, consistent with previous evidence on city growth (Glaeser and Tobio 2008). Before
1970, people were moving to warmer cities, but not to warmer rural areas.
The three decades since have seen a remarkable rise of the Sun Belt. From 1970 to 2000
warmth is a strong positive predictor of population growth for all counties, and ten extra
degrees of January temperature are associated with an extra .1 log points of population
growth
In Table 3, we show the impact of initial population, January temperature, proximity
to the Great Lakes and longitude in multivariate regressions for six di⁄erent thirty-year
periods.5 Di⁄erences across columns remind us that all variables had di⁄erent impacts in
di⁄erent epochs, and that regional growth can only be understood by bringing in outside
information about changing features of the U.S. economy.
In the antebellum era, U.S. population was spreading out: proximity to the Great Lakes
had a positive impact on growth, while longitude, January temperature and especially initial
population had a negative impact. The overall explanatory power of these variables drops
signi￿cantly for the late 19th century. Warmer areas grew more quickly, although the un-
dercounting of Southern population in the 1870 Census means that this coe¢ cient should be
cautiously interpreted. January temperature also had a positive e⁄ect on population growth
from 1900 to1930, but so did proximity to the East Coast and to the Great Lakes. Places
with more initial population grew more quickly, re￿ ecting the growth of big cities during
those decades. Results for 1940-1970 are quite similar, except that January temperature is
no longer signi￿cant. After 1970, January temperature becomes the most powerful predictor
of county-level growth. Population moves east rather than west. Initial population is neg-
atively associated with growth, which presumably re￿ ects the growth of sprawl. Proximity
to the Great Lakes has a slight negative impact on county-level population growth.
For the post-war period we also have income data that can help us make more sense of
5We skip the 1860s, which are unusual because of the Civil War, and the 1930s, which are unusual because
of the Great Depression.
11the growth of the South during this time period. Table 4 shows the correlation of county
median incomes and other variables.6 The correlation between income growth and Janu-
ary temperature is highest in the 1950s and 1960s, when the connection between January
temperature and population growth is weakest. During this era, the Sun Belt was getting
much more prosperous but it wasn￿ t attracting a disproportionate number of migrants. After
1970, the connection between January temperature and income drops considerably, though
the correlation between population growth and January temperature rises. One explanation
for this phenomenon, given by Glaeser and Tobio (2008) is that over the last 30 years, sun-
shine and housing supply have gone together. The South seems to be considerably more
permissive towards new construction, which may well explain why three of the fastest grow-
ing American metropolitan areas since 2000 are in states of the old Confederacy (Atlanta,
Dallas and Houston).
Fact # 7: Income mean reverts
One explanation for Gibrat￿ s law is that areas receive productivity shocks that are propor-
tional to current productivity (Eeckhout 2004). But that interpretation is di¢ cult to square
with the well-known convergence of regional income levels found by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1991) and others. In our data sample, median incomes also mean revert. We have data on
median income levels starting in 1950, and the second column of Table 4 shows the correla-
tion between the decadal change in the logarithm of this variable and the logarithm of the
variable.
The table shows that during every decade except the 1980s, income growth was substan-
tially lower in places that started with higher income levels. Overall, if median income was
.1 log points higher in 1950, it grew by .066 log points less from 1950 to 2000, as Figure 4
shows. Income in 1950 can explain 72 percent of the variation in income since then. While
population levels persist, income levels generally do not.
Income convergence does seem to have fallen o⁄ after 1980, most notably during the
1980s and among larger cities. In the whole sample, as income in 1980 rises by .1 log points
income growth from 1980 to 2000 falls by .0049 log points. But the relationship is instead
positive for counties that began with more than 50,000 people. This weakening of income
convergence may be due to an increase in the returns to skill.
There is a positive correlation between population growth and initial income levels which
may explain some of the income convergence. Between 1950 and 1980, an extra .1 log points
of initial income was associated with a reduction in income growth of .06 log points and an
increase in population growth of .03 log points. But given conventional estimates of labor
6This income measure does nothing to control for the human capital composition of the population.
12demand elasticity (Borjas 2003), this population growth can only explain about a ￿fth of
income convergence. Other explanations for income convergence are that technology has
spread over space, and capital mobility and changing composition of the labor force. The
last explanation, however, is troubled by the fact that the share of the population with
college degrees has increased more quickly in places that had higher incomes in 1950; on
average a .1 log point increase in 1950 incomes is associated with a .007 percent increase in
the share of the adult population with college degrees.
Since 1980, higher income growth in one decade predicts lower income growth over the
next ten years. This can be reconciled with the strong positive persistence of population
growth if a steady ￿ ow of new people is pushing wages down in some areas.
Fact # 8: Manufacturing predicts the decline of cities but not the decline of
counties
Many papers have noted the negative correlation between concentration in manufacturing
and subsequent urban growth (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 1995). This correlation
does not appear in our county data. We use the share of the county￿ s employment that is in
manufacturing in 1950 as our measure of the concentration of the county in manufacturing
at the start of the post-war era.
Figure 5 shows that as the share of a county￿ s workers in manufacturing in 1950 rises by
10 percent, subsequent population growth rises by .07 log points. The e⁄ect grows stronger
if we control for initial population, January temperature and proximity to the Great Lakes.
It gets slightly weaker if we control for initial income, because manufacturing counties had
higher wages.
This positive correlation does not hold for the more populous counties, which presumably
explains why city and metropolitan-area data show a negative connection between manu-
facturing and growth. If we restrict our sample to counties with more than 100,000 people
in 1950, the correlation becomes negative. Manufacturing left cities, and cities that were
highly concentrated in manufacturing declined.
At the county level, an initial concentration in manufacturing does not seem to have had
such a negative impact. It does predict income decline in every decade except the 1980s: the
last column in Table 4 shows that a 10 percent rise in the share of manufacturing in 1950
is associated with a .114 log point fall in median incomes between 1950 and 2000. However,
once we control for initial income, manufacturing is positively associated with income growth
as well as population growth.
Again, the impact of manufacturing on income growth is more strongly negative in more
populous counties. This reinforces the view that manufacturing has proven to be far worse
13for densely populated areas than for those with fewer people. Big factories seem a better
match for moderate density levels (Glaeser and Kohlhase 2004).
Fact # 9: Education predicts post-war growth
A series of papers have also shown the connection between education and the success of cities
(Rauch 1993; Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 1995; Simon and Nardinelli 2002; Glaeser
and Saiz 2004; Shapiro 2006). We now ask whether this correlation also holds at the county
level. Table 5 shows the correlation between the share of the adult population with college
degrees and subsequent income and population growth. We have this during every decade
except 1960, and for that year, we use the college attainment rates in 1950 instead.
The ￿rst column shows that college attainment and population growth have a strong
positive correlation in our sample. In the long run, as the share of the population with
college degrees increases by 10 percent in 1940, population growth between 1940 and 2000
increases by .13 log points. Over shorter periods, the positive e⁄ect is strongest in the 1950s
and 1960s, and it holds in every decade but the 1970s, when there is a negative correlation
that becomes insigni￿cant when we control for the logarithm of 1970 population.
The second column shows results for income growth. Across the entire sample, there
is a negative relationship between initial education and subsequent income growth. This is
certainly not true across cities or metropolitan areas. Across counties, the e⁄ect is primarily
due to mean reversion in median incomes. Controlling for initial log income, the estimated
coe¢ cients for the initial share of the population with college degrees are always positive, and
they are statistically signi￿cant for the 1950s (.89), the 1960s (.55, using college attainment
in 1950), and the 1980s (.9). More educated places seem to be growing both in population
and income, once we account for the tendency of incomes to revert to the mean.
Glaeser and Resseger (2010) present evidence suggesting that skills have more impact
in larger cities. In theory, urban density is more valuable when it connects people who
have more to teach one another. The last two columns of Table 5 focus on those counties
that begin the decade with at least 100,000 people. Column 3 shows the population growth
correlations, which are uniformly positive, but not always larger than those observed in the
entire sample. Column 4 shows that the correlation between income growth and education is
always more positive for more populous counties than for the entire sample. In the 1950s and
1960s, when skills were negatively associated with income growth in the entire sample, skills
were positively associated with income growth in more populous counties. These results
support the view that there is a complementarity between skills and density.
In Table 6, we present two regressions looking at the entire 1950-2000 period. In the ￿rst
regression, income growth is the dependent variable. In the second regression, population
14growth is the dependent variable. We include as controls January temperature, longitude
and distance to the Great Lakes. We control for the logarithms of initial education and
population. We also include the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of the
population with college degrees and an interaction between the logarithm of 1950 popula-
tion and the share of the population with college degrees. We have normalized the initial
population by subtracting the mean of that variable in this sample; this enables us to glean
the impact of education for the mean city with the coe¢ cient in the regression.
Initial income strongly predicts subsequent income declines and signi￿cant population in-
creases. Initial population is negatively associated with both income and population growth.
Proximity to the East Coast, longitude and manufacturing are both positively correlated
with both income and population growth. Proximity to the Great Lakes has no impact on
population growth, but a negative correlation with income growth.
Education has a positive e⁄ect on both income and population growth. At the average
initial population level, as the share of adults with college degrees in 1950 increases by 3
percent (about one standard deviation), subsequent population growth increases by slightly
more than .12 log points (about 12 percent) and income growth rises by around 7 percent.
These e⁄ects are statistically signi￿cant and economically meaningful.
The e⁄ects of education on income and population growth are stronger for counties with
higher initial levels of population. As the level of population increases by one log point
(slightly less than one standard deviation), the impact of education on population growth
increases by 54 percent and the impact of education on income growth increases by 36
percent. Skills do seem, over the ￿fty year period, to have had a particularly strong positive
e⁄ect on income and population growth for areas that initially had higher levels of population.
While it is clear that skills matter during the post-war period, it is less clear whether skills
were as important before World War II. We are limited by an absence of good education data
during this earlier period, which is why Simon and Nardinelli (2002) focus on the presence
of skilled occupations in 1900. Yet because it seems worthwhile to know whether skilled
places also grew in the 19th century, Table 7 shows the correlation between the share of
the population with college degrees in 1940 and growth over the entire 1790-2000 period.
There are at least two major problems with this procedure. First, skill levels change, and a
place that is skilled in 1940 may well not have been skilled in 1840. We are only moderately
reassured by the .75 correlation between the share of the population with college degrees
in 1940 and the share of the adult population with college degrees in 2000. Second, it is
possible that skilled people came disproportionately to quickly growing areas. Indeed, there
is a strong positive correlation (.61) in our sample between population growth between 1940
and 2000 and the growth in the share of the population with college degrees over the same
15time period.
Despite these caveats, Table 7 shows the correlations over the long time period. The
￿rst column includes all of our counties; the second column shows results only for those
counties with more than 50,000 people at the start of the decade. The table shows a strong
positive correlation between skills in 1940 and growth in population for most of the twentieth
century. In the 19th century, education was largely uncorrelated with growth across the entire
sample. Among more populous counties, the correlation is generally positive after 1820. One
interpretation of these di⁄erences is that there was a complementarity between cities and
skills even in the 19th century. A second interpretation is that skills in 1940 are a reasonable
proxy for skills in the 19th century among more populous counties, but not for sparsely
populated areas that presumably changed more over the century.
Those di⁄erent interpretations yield di⁄erent conclusions about the long run correlation
between skills and population growth. If the latter interpretation is correct, and the cor-
relation disappears because skills in 1940 don￿ t correlate with 19th century skills, then the
skills-growth correlation may be the one relationship that holds virtually over our entire
sample. If, however, the former interpretation is correct, then the relationship between skills
and growth is, like everything else we￿ ve looked at, a phenomenon that holds only during
certain eras.
Moretti (2004) and Berry and Glaeser (2005) report a positive correlation between initial
levels of education and education growth over the post-war period. We con￿rm this powerful
fact with our cross-county data. We look at the relationship between change in the share
of population with college degrees between 1940 and 2000 and the share of the population
with college degrees in 1940. Over the entire sample, we estimate the relationship:
Change in share with BAs 1940￿ 2000 = .048 + 2.66 ￿ Share with BAs in 1940.
(.003) (.088)
(2)
Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 1326 observations and the R2 is .4. As the
share with college degrees in 1940 increases by 2 percent, growth in the share of college
degrees increases by 5.32 percent. Figure 6 illustrates this relationship.7 The only decade
in which there is no positive correlation between initial schooling and subsequent growth in
schooling is the 1940s. Afterwards, schooling uniformly predicts schooling growth. In the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the correlation coe¢ cients between initial schooling and subsequent
increases in the share with college degrees are .57, .66 and .54 respectively. One of the reasons
why initially skilled places have done so well is quite possibly that they have attracted more
7To make the graph less cluttered, we only display counties with at least 50,000 people in 1940.
16skilled people over time.
Fact # 10: Firm size is strongly correlated with employment and income growth
after 1980
Glaeser et al. (1992) found a strong negative correlation between average ￿rm size and
subsequent growth across large industrial groups within metropolitan areas. Glaeser, Kerr
and Ponzetto (2010) show that smaller ￿rm size predicts growth both across and within
metropolitan areas. Our last fact is that ￿rm size is correlated with population and income
growth across our sample of counties.
Firm size is typically measured by looking at the ratio of the number of establishments
to the number of employees within a metropolitan area or industrial cluster. In our case, we
use the 1977 County Business Patterns data and calculate the average number of employees
per establishment in each county in our sample. The variable ranges from 2.9 to 35, with a
sample mean of 12.74. There is a strong positive correlation between county population and
average establishment size.
Table 8 shows four growth regressions that include average establishment size. The ￿rst
two look at population growth between 1980 and 2000. Columns 3 and 4 show results on
growth in median income over the same two decades. Columns 1 and 3 look at our entire
sample. Columns 2 and 4 look only at those counties that had at least 50,000 people in 1980.
In all cases, we include our standing controls including the logarithms of initial income and
population, the share of the labor force in manufacturing, our geographic controls and the
initial share of the population with a college degree. The e⁄ect of these variables is unchanged
from our previous regressions.
Regressions 1 and 2 both show the strong negative correlation between average estab-
lishment size and subsequent population growth. As average establishment size rises by four
workers (approximately one standard deviation), subsequent population growth declines by
.06 log points across the entire sample. The e⁄ect is somewhat larger for more populous
counties, where the decline is around 10 percentage points.
Regressions 3 and 4 show the strong negative connection between average establishment
size and income growth. As average establishment size increases by four, income growth
declines by .045 log points across the entire sample, and by .06 log points in the sample
of more populous counties. These e⁄ects are comparable in magnitude with the education
e⁄ect on income growth and even stronger statistically.
While larger establishment sizes do seem to predict less growth of income and population,
it is less clear how to interpret these facts. Glaeser et al. (1992) interpreted the positive
connection between small ￿rm size and later growth as evidence on the value of competition.
17Miracky (1995) observed the same phenomenon and associated it with the product life cycle.
While this remains one plausible interpretation, the fact that these connections occur within
very ￿nely detailed industry groups, and controlling for average establishment age, speaks
against this interpretation. Glaeser, Kerr and Ponzetto (2010) suggest that these connections
suggest the value of local entrepreneurship. We prefer this latter interpretation, which will
￿t closely with the following model, but we certainly acknowledge that other interpretations
are possible. We also recognize that entrepreneurship has received multiple de￿nitions and
has proven di¢ cult to measure empirically. Our ultimate focus is on entrepreneurs as the
drivers of change, innovation and productivity growth (Audretsch 1995). In practice, such
entrepreneurial activity has been commonly proxied by business ownership rates and by the
creation of new ￿rms, while small ￿rms have been increasingly recognized as key contributors
to innovation (Audretsch 2003).
In the last two columns of Table 7, we also look at the correlation between ￿rm size and
growth during early decades. We use average establishment size in 1977, an ex-post measure
that raises all the concerns we had about using schooling in 1940 to proxy for education in
the 19th century. In this case, the negative relationship between ￿rm size in 1977 and growth
is not present during earlier decades. Either the small ￿rm size e⁄ect is speci￿c to the past
thirty years, or small ￿rm size in 1977 doesn￿ t capture small ￿rm size during earlier years.
Certainly, when Glaeser et al. (1992) looked at ￿rm size in 1957, they found a negative
correlation with subsequent growth.
3 Theoretical Framework
We now present a model of regional change, skills and resilience. The model provides a
framework that will enable us to understand better the reasons why skilled areas have grown
more quickly over the past sixty years. In principle, it is possible that skilled places could have
been growing more quickly because of improvements in productivity, amenities or housing
supply. We need a formal framework to help separate these competing explanations. The
model will also deliver some intuition as to why skills have been so important in the older
areas of the U.S. that seems to have been hit by adverse shocks after World War II.
Individual utility is de￿ned over consumption of land, denoted L, and a CES aggregate











where ￿i > 0 is a quality of life multiplier associated with the exogenous amenities of city i.
18Each entrepreneur manufactures a di⁄erentiated variety employing labor according to
the linear production function
x(￿) = ain(￿), (4)
where x(￿) is the output of ￿rm ￿, n(￿) its workforce, and ai the productivity of en-
trepreneurs in city i. The Appendix derives the optimal pricing and hiring decisions of
monopolistically competitive manufacturers.
City i is endowed with an exogenous number of entrepreneurs, denoted Ei. With an













having normalized to unity the price index for the composite manufactured good.
City i has a ￿xed quantity of land, denoted by ￿ Li, which is owned by developers who reside
in the city itself. Given the utility function (3), workers, entrepreneurs, and developers all
choose to spend a fraction 1￿￿ of their income on consumption of land. Hence equilibrium








In an open-city model in which workers are fully mobile, their utility needs to be equalized





j for all i, j. (7)
We consider a continuum of cities, each of which is arbitrarily small compared to the ag-
gregate economy. Then, letting N =
R
Njdj denote the aggregate size of the workforce, for
each city i the equilibrium workforce is
logNi = ￿N +
￿ log￿i + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)logai + ￿logEi + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ log ￿ Li
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿
, (8)
where the constant ￿N is independent of idiosyncratic shocks a⁄ecting the city. Likewise,
for given constants ￿w and ￿r equilibrium wages are
logwi = ￿w +
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)logai + logEi ￿ log ￿ Li
￿
￿ log￿i
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿
, (9)
19and equilibrium rents
logri = ￿r +
(￿ ￿ 1)(log￿i + logai) + logEi ￿ log ￿ Li
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿
. (10)
The three constants ￿N, ￿w and ￿r are de￿ned exactly in the Appendix
A disaggregation of city-speci￿c productivity into separate components for manufacturing
and logistical e¢ ciency enables the model to provide a simple account of the role of transport
costs in the pattern of U.S. regional dynamics during the latter part of the twentieth century.
Speci￿cally, let productivity in city i at time t be







In this decomposition, Ai;t captures the productive e¢ ciency achieved at time t by entrepre-
neurs in city i, measured by output per worker in their ￿rms. However, delivering goods to
the ￿nal consumer involves transportation and distribution costs such that for every x units
shipped from a plant in city i, only xexp(￿￿i=Tt) reach the ￿nal consumer, according to
the conventional speci￿cation of ￿iceberg￿transport costs. The time-invariant city-speci￿c
parameter ￿i > 0 is a measure of each city￿ s natural logistical advantages, resulting from
geographic characteristics such as access to waterways. The time-varying common parame-
ter Tt measures the ability of transportation technology to overcome natural obstacles. The
following result then obtains.
Proposition 1 Advances in transportation technology reduce the share of the cross-city vari-


















for all ￿i;t 2 fNi;t;wi;t;ri;tg.
Our stylized fact 5 emphasized that the rise of the Great Lakes region was due to the
crucial importance of proximity to the waterways through which most domestic trade used
to ￿ ow. Over time, technological progress was a substitute for a favorable location: as
transportation technology improved (an increase in Tt), natural harbors and geographic ac-
cessibility (￿i) came to matter less for regional success. Heterogeneity in amenities (￿i;t),
housing supply (￿ Li;t) and entrepreneurial achievement (Ai;t and Ei;t) then acquired propor-
tionally greater importance, leading to the rise of the Sun Belt (fact 6) and the enduring
20success of cities and regions with the highest levels of human capital (fact 9).
Through equations (8), (9), and (10), the model provides us with the basis for our
empirical work in Section 4. We assume that for each city i and time t the values of ￿i;t, ai;t,
Ei;t and ￿ Li;t evolve according to the dynamics




























￿ Li;t+k = ￿ Li;t exp
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k￿










￿ L connect time-invariant city characteristics, denoted







For any set of variables Xi we can then write
logNi;t+1 ￿ logNi;t =
￿￿
￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿
a + ￿￿
E + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿ L





















where Ni;t and wi;t are the number of workers and the wage level in city i at time t, and "N
i;t
and "w
i;t are error terms.
We could perform a similar ￿rst di⁄erence for housing costs, but our data on real estate
typically involve home prices, which are a stock of value rather than a ￿ ow. The stock value
of land in our model at time t, denoted Vi;t, can be interpreted as the discounted value of

























￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ X
i (19)
is the time-invariant expected growth rate of future rents and "r
t+k the relative error term.
21For a time-invariant error distribution,














If then, we have estimated coe¢ cients for a variable, such as schooling, in population,
income, and housing-value growth regressions of BPop, BInc, and BV al respectively, then by
combining these estimated coe¢ cients it is possible to uncover the underlying connections
between a variable and growth in amenities, land availability, and entrepreneurship. Algebra
yields the e⁄ect on residential amenities
￿
￿
s = ￿BInc + (1 ￿ ￿)BV al, (21)
on the supply of real estate
￿
￿ L
s = BPop + BInc ￿ BV al, (22)
and on productivity-increasing entrepreneurship
~ ￿
E




s = BPop + ￿BInc. (23)
The last coe¢ cient captures both the extensive margin of entrepreneurship, which corre-
sponds to the creation of more numerous ￿rms, and its intensive margin, namely the creation
of more e¢ cient ￿rms. The two components can be disentangled through their di⁄erent im-
pact on average ￿rm size, measured by employment per ￿rm ni = Ni=Ei, which evolves
as
logni;t+1 ￿ logni;t =
￿￿
￿ + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿
￿ L ￿ ￿
E
￿





If an additional average ￿rm size growth regression yields an estimated coe¢ cient of BSiz,







and the e⁄ect on the extensive margin is
￿
E
s = BPop ￿ BSiz. (26)
223.1 Endogenous Entrepreneurship and Responses to Shocks
While the previous equations will serve to frame our empirical work in Section 4, we now
focus on the connection between skills, entrepreneurship and regional resilience. An adverse
regional shock can be understood as a reduction ￿i in the exogenous stock of entrepreneurs
￿ Ei, due to death or technological obsolescence or migration, so only ￿ Ei ￿ ￿i entrepreneurs
remain. The ability of a region to respond to such a shock will depend on the production
of new ideas. To address this, we endogenize entrepreneurship, and assume that all workers
are endowed with one unit of time that they can spend either working or engaging in entre-
preneurial activity. The time cost of trying to become an entrepreneur is a ￿xed quantity t.
If the worker becomes an entrepreneur, she has an individual-speci￿c probability ￿ of being
successful. The value of an entrepreneurial attempt is thus ￿￿i + (1 ￿ t)wi.
We assume that there is a distribution of ￿ in the population such that the share of agents
with probability of success no greater than ￿ equals ￿￿ for ￿ 2 (0;1).8 Given this assumption,
suppose that city i has a number Mi of potential entrepreneurs. All those with probabilities
of success greater than ￿ ￿i attempt entrepreneurship, while those with probability of success
below ￿ ￿i spend all their time as employees. Then the total number of entrepreneurs equals









while the labor supply is
Ni = [1 ￿ t(1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
i )]Mi. (28)
These in turn determine wages wi and ￿rm pro￿ts ￿i, as detailed in the appendix. It is
privately optimal for an agent to attempt entrepreneurship if and only if his probability of
success is ￿￿i ￿ twi. Thus an equilibrium is given by
￿ ￿i = 1 if Mi ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)t
￿ ￿ Ei ￿ ￿i
￿
, (29)
and if instead Mi > (￿ ￿ 1)t
￿ ￿ Ei ￿ ￿i
￿
, by
￿ ￿i 2 [0;1] such that ￿ ￿i =
(￿ ￿ 1)t
1 ￿ t(1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿
i )











which is uniquely de￿ned since the right-hand side is a monotone decreasing function of ￿ ￿i.
In particular if t = 1, so people are either would-be entrepreneurs or employees, then
the following result holds for a closed city with an exogenous number ￿ Mi of agents choosing
between employment and entrepreneurship.
8In other words, 1=￿ has a Pareto distribution with a minimum of 1 and shape parameter ￿.
23Proposition 2 In a closed city, both wages and the number of employers fall in response to
a negative shock (@ logwi=@￿i < 0 and @ logEi=@￿i < 0), but their proportional decline is
smaller in magnitude if the endogenous supply of entrepreneurs is more elastic
(@2 logwi=(@￿@￿i) ￿ 0 and @2 logEi=(@￿@￿i) ￿ 0).
Proposition 2 delivers the connection between urban resilience and entrepreneurship in a
closed-city framework. As older employers either go bankrupt or leave the city, this causes
incomes in the city to decline. This negative shock can be o⁄set by entrepreneurship, as a
decline in wages causes entrepreneurship to become relatively more attractive. If the supply
of entrepreneurship is more elastic, which is captured by a higher value of the parameter
￿, then there is a stronger entrepreneurial response to urban decline and the impact of a
negative shock on incomes becomes less severe.
The closed-city model also allows us to shed light on the observed correlation between
urban resilience and cross-city di⁄erences in average ￿rm size.
Proposition 3 Consider a set of closed cities with identical size, Mi = ￿ M for all i. Both
wages and the number of employers fall in response to a negative shock (@ logwi=@￿i < 0
and @ logEi=@￿i < 0), but their proportional decline is smaller in magnitude in cities with
a lower initial average ￿rm size (@2 logwi=(@￿i@ni) < 0 and @2 logEi=(@￿i@ni) < 0).
Keeping city size constant, higher ￿rm density and smaller average ￿rm size are the
indication of greater entrepreneurship. When a negative shock hits, some ￿rms are forced to
shut down by exogenous forces such as the obsolescence of their product or the death of an
entrepreneur. Although cushioned by the entry of new entrepreneurs, this blow implies a fall
in the number of employers and in the local wage level. Intuitively, the crisis is more severe
in cities that did not have a diversi￿ed set of ￿rms to begin with, because those cities are
reliant on a few large employers and thus su⁄er disproportionately from the disappearance
of any single ￿rm.
To extend our analysis to the open-city model, we assume that t = 0, so there is no time
cost to entrepreneurship. In this case, everyone tries to be an entrepreneur, which means that
￿ ￿ = 0. In a closed city, it would remain true that @wi=@￿i < 0 and @2 logwi=(@￿@￿i) > 0,
so a greater endogenous supply of entrepreneurs o⁄sets the negative e⁄ects of an exogenous
shock to the number of employers. When the city is open, we assume that people choose
their location before the realization of their individual entrepreneurial ability ￿. Spatial
equilibrium then requires ￿iyir
￿￿1
i = ￿ U for all i, where yi ￿ wi + ￿i￿=(1 + ￿) denotes
expected earnings. With a continuum of atomistic cities, the following result holds.
24Proposition 4 Expected earnings, the total number of employers, and the price of land
decrease in the exogenous negative shock to the endowment of employers (@yi=@￿i < 0,
@Ei=@￿i < 0, and @ri=@￿i < 0) and increase in the endogenous supply of entrepreneurs
(@yi=@￿ > 0, @Ei=@￿ > 0, and @ri=@￿ > 0). The labor supply and city population (￿i ￿
￿ Ei ￿￿i +Ni) increase in the endogenous rate of entrepreneurship (@￿i=@￿ = @Ni=@￿ > 0).
If the endogenous supply of entrepreneurs is su¢ ciently elastic, population decreases with an
exogenous negative shock to the endowment of employers (￿ ￿ 1=(￿ ￿ 1) ) @￿i=@￿i < 0).
In the limit case ￿ = 1, the labor supply and city population both decrease with an exoge-
nous negative shock to the endowment of employers (@￿i=@￿i < @Ni=@￿i < 0). Moreover,
a greater endogenous supply of entrepreneurship mutes the proportional impact of a negative
endowment shock on expected earnings, the total number of employers and city population
(d2 logyi=(d￿d￿i) > 0,d2 logEi=(d￿d￿i) > 0, and d2 log￿i=(d￿d￿i) > 0).
Proposition 4 makes the point that entrepreneurship can substitute for a decline in an
area￿ s core industries in a way that keeps population, earnings, and real-estate values up.
A higher rate of exodus for older industries will cause a city to lose both population and
income, but that can be o⁄set if the city also has a higher rate of new entrepreneurship.
What factors are likely to make entrepreneurship more common? One possibility is skilled
workers have a comparative advantage at producing new ideas. To capture this intuition,
we assume that there are two types of workers. Less skilled workers have one unit of human
capital and have a value of ￿=(1 + ￿) equal to ￿. The assumption that skilled workers are
more likely to be successful entrepreneurs is supported by the evidence in Glaeser (2009).
More skilled workers have 1 + H units of human capital, where H > 0, and have a value of
￿=(1 + ￿) equal to ￿ ￿. We assume that the high and low human capital workers are perfect
substitutes in production and that the share of high human capital workers in city i is ￿xed
at hi (this is a closed-city model). In this case, the total number of employers is
Ei = ￿ Ei ￿ ￿i + [hi￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ hi)￿]Ni, (31)
and the following result obtains.




of the exogenous negative shock for which changes in human capital have no impact
on the wages earned by each type of worker (￿i = ￿ ￿i , @wi=@hi = 0). If ￿i is above that
value wages rise with the share of skilled workers (￿i > ￿ ￿i , @wi=@hi > 0), and if ￿i is
below that value wages decline with the share of skilled workers (￿i < ￿ ￿i , @wi=@hi < 0).
If ￿ ￿ ￿ H ￿ Ei=Ni + (1 + H)￿, then wages for both classes of workers rise with the share




), and if ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + H)￿ wages for both






Proposition 5 illustrates one way in which human-capital externalities might work. There
are always two e⁄ects of having more skilled workers on earnings. More skilled workers
can depress earnings because they are more productive and therefore lower the marginal
product of labor when the number of employers is held ￿xed. But more skilled workers
also increase the number of employers, and this causes wages to rise. If ￿ ￿ is higher than
H ￿ Ei=Ni + (1 + H)￿, so skilled workers have a real comparative advantage at innovation,
then wages will always rise with the share of skilled workers. This is one way in which human
capital externalities might operate.
The proposition also illustrates the connection between adverse shocks and the value of
having more skilled workers in the city. When there is more adverse economic shock that
destroys the stock of old employers, then it is more likely that skilled workers will increase
wages for everyone. When the shock is less severe, then skilled workers are less likely to
improve everyone￿ s welfare.
Proposition 5 examines the potential impact that skills can have on urban wages and
success in the face of a downturn. The human capital needed to innovate might also result
from experience in management, especially of smaller ￿rms. We will not formally model this,
but just note that the human capital needed to develop new ￿rms may come from working
in smaller, more entrepreneurial ventures. This would then be another reason why smaller
￿rms are a source of urban resilience.
4 Why Do Educated Cities Grow?
We now turn to the primary statistical exercise of this paper: an examination of the link
between education and metropolitan growth. Since we are focusing entirely on this later pe-
riod, we switch from counties to metropolitan areas to be in line with past research. We also
use data from entire United States. We follow Shapiro (2006) and Glaeser and Saiz (2004)
and attempt to assess the reasons why skilled cities might grow more quickly. We di⁄er from
these earlier studies in two primary ways. First, we estimate all of our results for di⁄erent
regions. This enables us to estimate whether human capital has di⁄erent e⁄ects in declining
areas (e.g. the Midwest) and growing areas. Second, we use the methodology described in
Section 3, which enables us to assess whether human capital is increasing population growth
because of increasing productivity (or entrepreneurship), amenities or housing supply.
One set of regressions focus on metropolitan area level regressions, where our basic




= BY ￿ Schooling1970 + Other Controls. (32)
In this case, Y denotes one of three outcome variables: population, median income and
self-reported housing values. We focus only on the long di⁄erence between 1970 and 2000.
Our second approach is to use individual data and estimate:
logYt = MSA Dummies + Individual Controls + BY ￿ Schooling1970 ￿ I2000, (33)
where Y in this case indicates either labor-market earnings or self-reported housing values.
We pool together data for 1970 and 2000. In the case of the earnings regressions, individual
controls include individual schooling, age and race. In the case of the housing value regres-
sions, individual controls include structural characteristics such as the number of bedrooms
and bathrooms. In both cases, we allow the coe¢ cients on these characteristics to change
by year and we include an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the year is 2000.
Our primary focus is on the coe¢ cient BY that multiplies the interaction between the
share of the adult population with college degrees in 1970 and the year 2000. Essentially,
this coe¢ cient is assessing the extent to which housing values and incomes increased in more
educated places. We prefer this speci￿cation to the raw income growth or housing value
growth regressions because these regressions can control for di⁄erences in the returns to
various individual characteristics.
One novelty of our work here is that we estimate the impact of education separately by
regions. To do this, we interact BY with four region dummies, and thereby allow the impact
of schooling on population, income and housing value growth to di⁄er by region. These
di⁄erent regional parameter estimates will then imply di⁄erent estimates of the underlying
parameters found using the formulas of the last section.
Table 9 shows our results for metropolitan area level regressions. In all regressions, we
include the initial values of the logarithm of population, median income and housing values.
We also include three region dummies (the Midwest is the omitted category). The ￿rst
regression shows the overall impact of education in this sample. As the share of the adult
population with college degrees increased by 5 percent in 1970, predicted growth between
1970 and 2000 increases by about 8 percent.
The other coe¢ cients in the regression are generally unsurprising. Growth was faster
in the South and the West. Gibrat￿ s law holds and population is unrelated to population
growth. Places with higher housing values actually grew faster, perhaps because their ex-
pensiveness re￿ ected a higher level of local amenities. Places with higher incomes grew more
27slowly, perhaps re￿ ecting the movement away from high-wage, manufacturing metropolitan
areas.
The second regression allows the impact of education in 1970 to di⁄er by region. The
strongest e⁄ect appears in the South, where a 5 percent increase in share of adults with college
degrees in 1970 is associated with 19 percent faster population growth. The second largest
coe¢ cient appears in the Northeast. In that region, the coe¢ cient is about the national
average, even though it is not statistically signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient is slightly smaller in
the Midwest, where a 5 percentage point increase in the share of adults with college degrees
in 1970 is associated with a 6.5 percentage point predicted increase in population between
1970 and 2000. In this case, however, the coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant. In the West,
the impact of education on population growth is negative and insigni￿cant.
Our third regression looks at median growth in income. Income mean reverts, but in-
creases in high housing value areas, perhaps suggesting that wealthier people are moving
to higher-amenity areas. Incomes rose by less in the West; the other region dummies are
statistically insigni￿cant. There is a strong positive e⁄ect of initial education levels, which
re￿ ects in part the returns to skill and the tendency of skilled people to move to already
skilled areas. As the share of the population with college degrees in 1970 increased by 5
percent, median incomes increase by 4 percent more since then.
The fourth regression estimates di⁄erent initial education by region. Education has a
positive e⁄ect on income growth in all four regions. The biggest impact is in the West,
where income growth increases by .07 log points as the share of the population with college
degrees in 1970 increases by 5 percentage points. The smallest impact of education on income
growth is in the Midwest, where the coe¢ cient is less than half of that found in the West.
The ￿fth and sixth regressions turn to appreciation in median housing values. Housing
values rose by more in more populous metropolitan areas. Prices increased somewhat less in
initially higher-income areas, perhaps re￿ ecting the mean reversion of income levels. Prices,
however, did not themselves mean revert. The West had much more price appreciation than
the other three regions. As the share of the population with college degrees in 1970 increased
by 5 percentage points, housing values increased by about 4 percent more.
The sixth regression allows the impact of college education on housing-value growth to
di⁄er by region. In this case, we ￿nd a big positive e⁄ect in the West, and far smaller e⁄ects
in all other regions. In the West, prices rose by more than 10 percent more as the share of
the population with college degrees in 1970 increased by 5 percentage points. In the other
regions, the impact of education is statistically insigni￿cant and less than one-￿fth of its
impact in the West. It is notable that the region where education had its weakest impact
on population growth is the area where it had its largest impact on housing-value growth.
28This di⁄erence shows the value of examining the impact of education by region.
The seventh and eight regressions examine the connection between education and average
￿rm size. In the model, the number of ￿rms per worker re￿ ects the number of entrepreneurs
in the area. If education is associated with a greater increase in population than in average
￿rm size, then it is also associated with an increase in the number of ￿rms, which we interpret
as an increase in the amount of in entrepreneurship. In the seventh regression, we estimate
a coe¢ cient of .8 on college graduation rates across the whole sample. This coe¢ cient is
substantially lower than the population growth coe¢ cient, so this suggests, at least according
to the logic of the model, that the number of entrepreneurs is growing more quickly in more
educated areas.
In the eighth regression, we allow the coe¢ cient on education to di⁄er by region. The
strongest e⁄ect is in the East; the weakest in the West. In both the East and the West, the
coe¢ cient on education is higher in the average ￿rm size regression than in the population
growth regression. The very strong coe¢ cient on average ￿rm size in the East appears to
be driven by two types of metropolitan areas. There are some less educated metropolitan
areas where ￿rm size is dramatically decreasing, presumably because large plants all closing.
There are also some well educated metropolitan areas, including Boston, where ￿rm size
is increasing dramatically, perhaps because of the dominance of certain big-￿rm industries,
such as health care. In the West, more educated areas seem also to be moving into larger,
rather than smaller, ￿rm industries.
Table 10 turns to wages and housing values using individual-level data. We look at
annual earnings and restrict our sample to prime-age males (between 25 and 55), who work
at least 30 hours a week and over 40 weeks per year. These restrictions are meant to limit
issues associated with being out of the labor force. We control for individual human-capital
characteristics, including years of experience and education, and allow for the impact of these
variables to di⁄er by area. As such, these coe¢ cients can be understood as the impact of
skills on area income growth correcting for the movement of skilled people across places and
the rise in the returns to skill. All regressions also control for the initial levels of income,
population and housing values, just like the metropolitan area level regressions. We also have
MSA dummies in each regression, controlling for the permanent income di⁄erences between
places.
The ￿rst regression shows a raw coe¢ cient of .557, which implies that as the share of
college graduates in a metropolitan area in 1970 increases by 5 percentage points, earnings
rise by .028 log points more over the next thirty years. Comparing this coe¢ cient with the
coe¢ cient on education (.8) in regression 3 in Table 10 suggests that almost a third of the
metropolitan-area coe¢ cient is explained by the rise in returns to skill at the individual level
29and increased sorting across metropolitan areas. The second regression adds in industry
dummies, and the coe¢ cient drops to .442.
The third regression compares the impact of education at the area level with education
at the industry level in 1970. In this case, we allow the MSA dummies to di⁄er by year, so
these e⁄ects should be understood as across industries but within metropolitan area. The
cross-industry e⁄ect of education on income growth is also positive, but it is much weaker
than the e⁄ect at the metropolitan area level.
Regressions 4 and 5 look the impact of the initial education level in the MSA-industry. We
calculate the share of workers in that metropolitan area in that industry in 1970 with college
degrees. We then control for MSA-year dummies and industry ￿xed e⁄ects in regression 4.
We ￿nd that more skilled sectors are seeing faster wage growth. Regression 5 shows that
this e⁄ect does not withstand allowing the industry e⁄ects, nationwide, to vary by year.
Regression 6 essentially duplicates regression 1 of the table allowing the coe¢ cient on
education to di⁄er by region. In this case, however, unlike the metropolitan area level tables,
we ￿nd that there are few signi￿cant regional di⁄erences. The coe¢ cient is slightly higher
in the Northeast, but the e⁄ects are generally quite similar and close to the national e⁄ect.
In regressions 7 and 8 we estimate housing price appreciation using individual-level hous-
ing data and controlling for individual housing characteristics. Regression 7 shows the overall
national coe¢ cient of 3.3. Regression 8 estimates di⁄erent e⁄ects by region, and again shows
that housing price appreciation has gone up faster in the West.
Table 11 then shows our estimated coe¢ cients, using the formulas in Section 3: ￿
￿
j =
￿BInc+(1 ￿ ￿)BV al, ￿
￿ L
j = BPop+BInc￿BV al, and ~ ￿
E
j = BPop+￿BInc. We also use the ￿rm
size e⁄ect to separate the impact of education on ￿productivity,￿￿
a
j = (￿BInc + BSiz)=(￿ ￿ 1),
from the impact of education on ￿entrepreneurship,￿￿
E
j = BPop ￿ BSiz. These enable us
to combine these coe¢ cients and assess whether education is acting on housing supply, pro-
ductivity or amenities. To implement these equations we use a value of .7 for ￿, which is
compatible with housing representing 30 percent of consumption. For ￿, we use a value of
4, which corresponds to an average mark-up of 33 percent. Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008)
present some support for this calibration, which only impacts on the estimated connection
between skills and productivity growth.
The ￿rst ￿ve columns show results for the country and each region using only the
metropolitan area level coe¢ cients. Columns 6-10 show results using the metropolitan area
estimates for population growth and the area-level estimates for income and housing price
growth. The estimates show standard errors estimated by bootstrap. However, we believe
that these standard errors substantially overstate the actual precision of these estimates,
since they take into account only the error involved in our estimated parameters, not the
30possibility that our assumed parameters, and indeed the model itself, are at best noisy
approximations of reality.
The ￿rst column shows a positive connection between productivity growth and skills
everywhere. The national coe¢ cient is about 5, meaning that as the share of the population
with college degrees increase by 5 percent, the growth in the number of entrepreneurs over
the next 30 years increases by 25 percent. The coe¢ cient is somewhat higher in the South
and somewhat lower in the West, but these di⁄erences are not statistically signi￿cant. Using
these national metropolitan-area coe¢ cients, we ￿nd that the impact of education on the
growth of productivity, or entrepreneurship, is reasonably homogeneous across regions.
The second column shows results for amenity growth. In every region the coe¢ cient is
negative, suggesting that amenities have been shrinking rather than growing in skilled areas.
This comes naturally out of the model because real wages have, according to our formulation,
been shrinking in skilled places. Again, with the metropolitan area level coe¢ cients, the
impact of skills on amenities is fairly similar across regions. However, if housing were a
larger share of consumption or if housing prices were actually proxying for the growth of all
prices, then the real wage e⁄ect would be zero and hence the implied connection between
skills and amenity growth would be zero as well.
The third column looks at the growth of housing supply. Overall, skills have been asso-
ciated with increases in housing supply, but there are very substantial regional di⁄erences.
In the South, there is an extremely strong implied relationship between skills and housing
supply growth. In the West, the implied relationship is negative. These di⁄erences re￿ ect
the very di⁄erent relationship between skills and population growth in the South and in the
West. We think that in a richer model with a better developed construction sector, these
e⁄ects would appear as a movement along a supply curve rather than an actual shift in the
supply of housing, and that the di⁄erences between West and South could be explained, at
least in part, by very di⁄erent housing supply elasticities (as found by Saiz, forthcoming).
Columns 4 and 5 decompose the overall productivity e⁄ect into an e⁄ect associated
with rising values of ￿rm-level productivity (aj, column 4) and rising levels of entrepre-
neurship (Ej, column 5). Column 1 is equal to three times column 4 plus column 5
(~ ￿
E




j ). In the ￿rst row, we ￿nd that education is signi￿cantly associ-
ated with increases in ￿rm-level productivity and insigni￿cantly associated with increases
in entrepreneurship. Overall, the ￿rm-level productivity coe¢ cient is responsibility for 84
percent of the connection between education and total productivity.
The next rows show that in both the East and the West, we ￿nd an insigni￿cant nega-
tive connection between area education and the entrepreneurship measure. In these areas,
education has a strong and quite similar positive correlation with ￿rm-level productivity. In
31the Midwest and the South, there is more of a positive correlation between area education
and entrepreneurship growth, and the connection is statistically signi￿cant in the South.
Columns 6-10 show results using individual-level regressions for housing and income. In
Column 6, the skills coe¢ cient on entrepreneurship growth is smaller, re￿ ecting the fact that
the connection between skills and income growth is lower in the individual-level regressions.
We believe that these estimates are more defensible. As in column 1, the connection be-
tween skills and entrepreneurship seems strongest in the South and weakest in the West.
In this case, the gulf in estimated coe¢ cients is much larger and statistically signi￿cant.
Understanding this regional gap seems like an important topic for future research.
Column 7 shows the connection between skills and amenity growth. Overall, the esti-
mated coe¢ cient is positive, but it is negative in three out of four regions. Only in the West
are skills positively associated with implied amenity growth, meaning that only in the West
are skills associated with declines in real wages. In the other regions, skills are associated
with rising real wages, which implies a decline in amenities. As discussed above, we do not
take this implication all that seriously, because it is quite sensitive to assumptions about
the connection between housing prices and the overall price level. Moreover, if unobserved
skill levels are rising in skilled metropolitan areas, then the rise in real wages, and hence the
implied decline in amenity levels, would also be somewhat illusory. We are more con￿dent
about the di⁄erence between regions￿ the rise in the value of amenities in skilled areas in
the West￿ than we are about the overall sign in the rest of the nation.
Column 8 shows the land growth e⁄ects, which are positive everywhere but in the West.
Just as in column 6, the West is the one region where skills seem associated with a decline
in housing availability. In this case, the e⁄ect seems to be quite strong, statistically and
economically; and indeed, the West is so powerful that it makes the estimated national
coe¢ cient negative. Housing supply has grown very little in skilled areas in the West,
perhaps because educated Westerners have been particularly e⁄ective in pushing for limits
on new construction.
Columns 9 and 10 show results when we break overall productivity in ￿rm-level produc-
tivity and the number of entrepreneurs. The basic patterns are quite similar to the MSA-level
coe¢ cients. Overall, the impact of education on both variables is positive, but the e⁄ect is
only statistically signi￿cant for the ￿rm-level productivity variable, which accounts for the
lion￿ s share of the overall productivity e⁄ect of education. In the East and West, the esti-
mated coe¢ cient of entrepreneurs on area level education is negative, but not statistically
signi￿cant. In the South, the coe¢ cient is strongly positive.
Overall, this exercise leads to four main conclusions. First, the impact of education on
productivity seems to be quite clear everywhere. Second, the growth of skilled places has
32far more to do with rising productivity than with amenity growth outside of the West, and
indeed, amenity levels may have been declining in skilled areas. This conclusion echoes the
￿ndings of Shapiro (2006) and Glaeser and Saiz (2004). Third, skills seem to depress housing
supply growth in the American West, and that is a substantial di⁄erence with other regions.
This negative connection could re￿ ect the ability and taste of skilled people for organizing to
oppose new construction. Fourth, the connection between education and overall productivity
growth does not, outside of the South, primarily re￿ ect a connection between education and
an increase in the number of entrepreneurs.
5 Education and Unemployment in the Great Reces-
sion
The previous section focused on the role that education played in mediating cities￿ability
to respond to the great shocks of the mid-20th century, but there has also been a more
recent crisis. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, a recession began
in December 2007. Unemployment then rose signi￿cantly in 2008 and 2009, rising above
10 percent in October 2009. But while the recession impacted on all of America, it did
not hit every place equally. In February 2010, the unemployment rate was over 20 percent
in Merced, California, and over 15 percent in Detroit, Michigan. At the same time, the
unemployment rate in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was 7.7 percent and in Boulder, Colorado,
only 6.5 percent.9
Just as education predicted the ability of older, colder cities to survive the mid-20th
century shocks, skills also predict the ability of cities today to weather the storm. Figure 7
shows the -.44 correlation between the share of adults with a college degree in a metropolitan
area and the unemployment rate in that area as of January 2010.
Although educational attainment is negatively correlated with unemployment at the in-
dividual level, the city-level correlation is too high to be entirely due to composition e⁄ects.











Group is the share of the adult labor force in each group in each metropolitan area
9U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. ￿Metropolitan Area Employment and Unem-
ployment ￿April 2010,￿news release, June 2, 2010. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/metro.pdf.
33in 2000 (the latest date available with reliable data), and UUSA
Group is the national unemployment
rate for the group, which was 5.1 percent for those with college degrees, 17.6 percent for high
school dropouts and 10.25 percent for the remainder.
Figure 8 shows the .48 correlation between actual unemployment and our predicted unem-
ployment measure. The key ￿nding is that the slope of the regression line is 1.78: as predicted
unemployment falls by 5 percent, actual unemployment declines by almost 8 percent. Ed-
ucation accounts for a greater decline in city unemployment than the national relationship
between education and unemployment would imply. This provides another piece of evidence
suggesting the existence of human capital spillovers.
Many interpretations of this fact are possible. It might be a coincidence that unemploy-
ment rates were unusually low in highly educated areas. People who live in educated areas
could be more skilled than their years of schooling suggest. This in turn might re￿ ect sort-
ing, but also human capital spillovers that enhance unobserved skill levels (Glaeser 1999).
The model in section 3 emphasized that skilled workers are both employers and employees.
Hence the strong negative e⁄ect of education on unemployment may re￿ ect the ability of
more skilled entrepreneurs to ￿nd opportunity in a downturn. Of course, this explanation is
now merely a hypothesis and further work will be needed to determine if it is correct.
6 Conclusion
The regional history of the eastern United States is best understood not through a set of
immutable laws, but as a progression of di⁄erent eras during which local attributes waxed
and waned in importance. Few if any growth patterns hold over the entire 150 year period:
many relationships, such as Gibrat￿ s Law, hold during some periods but not others. During
some periods growth is faster in more populous places, and during others population moves
to more sparsely populated areas. Warmth positively predicts growth during the late 19th
and 20th centuries, but not during the early parts of the two centuries.
To us, these ￿ndings support the view that regional and urban change is best understood
not as the application of time-invariant growth processes, but rather as a set of responses by
people and ￿rms to large-scale technological change. These responses are quite amenable to
formal modeling, but only to formal models that respect the changing nature of transporta-
tion and other technologies. The 19th century was primarily agricultural, and the spread
west re￿ ected the value of gaining access to highly productive agricultural land. The Great
Lakes were a magnet because they lowered otherwise prohibitive transport costs. During
the late 19th century, America became increasingly industrial and the population moved
to places that began the era with more population. Cities, like Detroit and Chicago, that
34had formed as hubs for transporting the wealth of American agriculture became centers for
producing manufactured goods such as cars.
Finally, during the post-war era, transportation costs fell still further and the population
de-concentrated. The Great Lakes declined and people moved to the Sun Belt. The older
areas that were best placed to reinvent themselves had a heavy concentration of skills and a
disproportionate number of small ￿rms, which may be a proxy for the level of entrepreneurial
human capital. Industry no longer created a strong reason for concentration in populated
counties, but it was increasingly valuable to be around skilled people. Our model formally
addressed reinvention in skilled areas.
When we examine the channels through which skills a⁄ect growth, we ￿nd that growth
in labor demand was signi￿cantly higher in more skilled areas, at least outside of the West.
But in the West, skilled areas appear to have experienced faster amenity growth, perhaps
because skilled people located in areas that were inherently more attractive. Skills were
positively correlated with housing supply growth in the Midwest and South, but strongly
negatively associated with housing supply growth in the West.
We also examine whether skills impact on labor demand primarily by increasing the
number of entrepreneurs, as measured by the number of establishments in an area, or by
increasing average ￿rm level productivity. We ￿nd that education positively predicts growth
in the number of establishments, but that this e⁄ect is relatively modest. The bulk of the
connection between skills and labor demand appears to re￿ ect a positive link between skills
and average ￿rm productivity.
America has experienced dramatic changes over the past 200 years, and population change
doesn￿ t appear to follow any form of strict rule. There has been a great deal of population
persistence in the eastern U.S., but population change has followed di⁄erent patterns at
di⁄erent times. Over the past thirty years, skills and small ￿rms have been strongly correlated
with growth, but that may not always be the case.
35A Appendix
A.1. Setup of the Model
The utility function (3) implies the demand function for each manufactured variety
q (￿) = ￿Y P
￿￿1p(￿)
￿￿ , (A1)








is the manufacturing price index, which we can set equal to one by a choice of numeraire. If
the wage in city i is wi, the price charged by the monopolistically competitive producer of





























which yields the equilibrium wage (5) for a given labor supply Ni. The pro￿ts earned by











































for all i, j, (A7)
which implies equation (8) for











































































+ ￿N + ￿w. (A11)
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
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37A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
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39A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
For t = 0, the total number of employers equals




































so expected earnings equal



































￿ Ei ￿ ￿i
Ni















































The price of land is
































































The spatial equilibrium requirement ￿iyir
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With a continuum of cities, changes in a single atomistic city i do not a⁄ect the aggregate
variables on the right-hand side, so the e⁄ects of changes in ￿ and ￿ Ei￿￿i on the equilibrium
workforce Ni can be taken from the constancy of
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which switches from positive to negative as ￿ ranges in (0;1).
41The exogenous endowment of entrepreneurs has an ambiguous impact on the labor supply:
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and so are the total number of employers
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which can be veri￿ed with tedious but straightforward algebra.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 5
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while if H ￿ Ei=Ni + (1 + H)￿ > ￿ ￿ > (1 + H)￿, then
@ logwi
@hi
= 0 , ￿i = ￿ Ei ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + H)￿
H
Ni ￿ ￿ ￿i, (A63)
and wages are increasing in hi for ￿i > ￿ ￿i and decreasing in hi for ￿i < ￿ ￿i.
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Figure 1
The Stability of Population
Source: County-level U.S. Census data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Eco-
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Figure 2
The Negative Correlation of Population Changes
Note: Figure shows the 54 counties that had more than 50,000 people in 1860.
Source: County-level U.S. Census data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Eco-
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Figure 3
Population Growth and the Proximity to the Great Lakes
Note: Figure shows the counties that are within 200 miles of a Great Lake.
Source: County-level U.S. Census data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Eco-
nomic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000.
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Figure 4
The Convergence of Median Incomes
Source: County-level U.S. Census data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Eco-
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Figure 5
Population Growth and Share in Manufacturing in 1950
Source: County-level U.S. Census data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Eco-
nomic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000.
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Share with Bachelor's Degree, 1940
Figure 6
Growth in Share of Population with a Bachelor Degree
Note: Figure shows the counties that had more than 50,000 people in 1940.
Source: County-level U.S. Census data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Eco-
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Figure 7
Unemployment in January 2010 and Education in 2000
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Figure 8
Actual Unemployment and Unemployment Predicted by Education
Source: Metropolitan Statistical Area level data from the U.S. Census, and Actual Unem-
ployment Rate from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.



















1790s . . -0.4681 -0.9505
1800s 0.3832 0.6462 -0.5625 0.1316
1810s 0.3256 0.4766 -0.5674 -0.0463
1820s 0.4423 0.5231 -0.5136 0.4178
1830s 0.4452 0.9261 -0.6616 0.241
1840s 0.4634 0.8978 -0.5122 0.3922
1850s 0.4715 0.7661 -0.319 -0.0392
1860s 0.3985 0.4631 0.0111 0.0065
1870s -0.1228 0.4865 -0.3614 -0.0205
1880s 0.3978 0.4541 -0.1252 0.3323
1890s 0.4935 0.5382 -0.1181 0.3691
1900s 0.4149 0.6454 0.1754 0.2947
1910s 0.5027 0.5778 0.2747 0.0903
1920s 0.476 0.4675 0.3381 0.1494
1930s 0.3005 0.4887 0.0415 -0.1585
1940s 0.4151 0.6752 0.3863 -0.0649
1950s 0.7397 0.7327 0.3985 0.0444
1960s 0.7225 0.8196 0.2922 0.0311
1970s 0.3821 0.4349 -0.2247 -0.4462
1980s 0.641 0.7096 0.1062 -0.0693
1990s 0.737 0.7863 -0.0197 -0.157
Table 1:
Population Growth Correlations
Source: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social











1790s -0.2646 0.3746 -0.0008
1800s -0.4368 0.4307 -0.226
1810s -0.3496 0.4473 -0.1891
1820s -0.2857 0.3053 -0.1514
1830s -0.3304 0.2631 -0.2676
1840s -0.3414 0.1442 -0.2424
1850s -0.3145 0.0703 -0.3466
1860s -0.1495 0.1028 -0.3229
1870s -0.046 -0.1188 0.2575
1880s -0.0256 -0.0336 0.1571
1890s -0.1145 -0.0771 0.2273
1900s 0.1159 0.0153 0.1339
1910s 0.1448 0.1185 -0.005
1920s 0.1733 0.1182 -0.0802
1930s -0.0144 -0.0462 0.0379
1940s 0.2431 0.1665 -0.13
1950s 0.2401 0.2075 -0.1843
1960s 0.1313 0.0915 -0.1062
1970s -0.0435 -0.163 0.2088
1980s 0.1974 -0.1107 0.2243
1990s -0.0027 -0.1567 0.2702
Table 2:
Geography Correlation Tables
Sources: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic,
Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000.  Geographical
information from ESRI GIS data.
56(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1800-1830 1830-1860 1870-1900 1900-1930 1940-1970 1970-2000
Average January Temperature -0.025 -0.033 0.008 0.007 -0.002 0.009
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002) (0.001)**
Distance to Center of Nearest Great Lake 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)
Longitude -0.038 -0.005 -0.000 0.011 0.017 0.008
(0.005)** (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.002)**
Log of Population, 1800 -0.255
(0.025)**
Log of Population, 1830 -0.551
(0.021)**
Log of Population, 1870 -0.126
(0.014)**
Log of Population, 1900 0.125
(0.013)**
Log of Population, 1940 0.103
(0.012)**
Log of Population, 1970 -0.021
(0.008)**
Constant 0.628 6.320 1.379 -0.407 0.523 0.872
(0.57) (0.505)** (0.268)** (0.263) (0.28) (0.213)**
Observations 368 788 1210 1276 1324 1338
R-squared 0.63 0.60 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.09
Sources: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000.




Note: Standard Errors in parenthesis (* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).














1950s 0.4023 -0.5692 -0.1215
1960s 0.4807 -0.7732 0.2888 -0.4119
1970s 0.3107 -0.6857 0.3303 -0.4911
1980s 0.1842 0.0904 -0.2839 0.086
1990s 0.07 -0.3492 -0.1966 -0.271
Table 4:
Income Growth Correlations
Source: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data:
The United States, 1790-2000.





















1950s 0.482 -0.2517 0.3634 0.0291
1960s 0.3758 -0.3864 0.346 0.1586
1970s -0.0961 -0.369 0.1122 -0.0391
1980s 0.3194 0.3564 0.3908 0.4739
1990s 0.1269 -0.2334 0.2396 -0.1017
Table 5:
Education Correlations
Source: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data:




Share of Workers in Manufacturing, 1950 0.3025 0.5597
(0.05) (0.1369)
Log of Population, 1950 -0.0868 -0.2817
(0.0139) (0.0381)




Distance to Center of Nearest Great Lake -0.0009 -0.0007
(0.0002) (0.0006)
Share with Bachelor Degrees, 1950 2.5141 4.3104
(0.3098) (0.8479)
Log of Population/Bachelor Degree Interaction, 1950 1.1749 2.7005
(0.2127) (0.5822)







Income and Population Growth Regressions, 1950-2000
Sources: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data:
The United States, 1790-2000. Geographical information from ESRI GIS data.
















1790s 0.0105 -0.309 0.1152 0.2688
1800s -0.1012 0.3758 0.0627 0.7698
1810s -0.096 -0.2574 0.0142 0.391
1820s -0.0543 0.3583 0.1338 0.7404
1830s -0.0102 0.5014 0.093 0.7733
1840s -0.008 0.381 0.113 0.5929
1850s 0.0208 0.1145 0.0651 0.0149
1860s 0.1457 0.0671 0.0779 0.2524
1870s -0.1386 -0.0157 0.0134 0.2407
1880s 0.0079 0.1089 0.1676 0.3557
1890s -0.1269 0.0522 0.0751 0.2893
1900s 0.1711 0.2133 0.222 0.2529
1910s 0.2265 0.1866 0.3172 0.3638
1920s 0.4162 0.3581 0.3476 0.2414
1930s 0.2304 0.3216 0.1594 0.0225
1940s 0.5904 0.5613 0.3336 0.1356
1950s 0.4953 0.3619 0.2273 0.0286
1960s 0.383 0.3298 0.1259 -0.0974
1970s -0.1614 -0.1199 -0.1786 -0.353
1980s 0.1129 0.0806 -0.0862 -0.3212
1990s -0.0878 -0.1116 -0.1715 -0.2893
Table 7:
Education and Firm Size Correlations with
Population Growth
Source: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and
Social Data: The United States, 1790-2000.






Share of Workers in Manufacturing, 1980 0.338 0.600 0.390 0.434
(0.063)** (0.117)** (0.031)** (0.052)**
Log of Population, 1980 -0.017 -0.039 0.001 0.008
(0.007)* (0.013)** (0.003) (0.006)
Share with Bachelor's Degree, 1980 0.493 0.830 0.966 0.846
(0.145)** (0.188)** (0.071)** (0.084)**
Distance to Center of Nearest Great Lake 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**
Average Establishment Size, 1977 -0.016 -0.022 -0.011 -0.012
(0.002)** (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Log of Median Income, 1980 0.519 0.646 -0.065 0.062
(0.039)** (0.071)** (0.019)** (0.032)
Longitude 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.007
(0.002)** (0.002) (0.001)** (0.001)**
Mean January Temperature 0.010 0.009 -0.003 -0.004
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Constant -4.629 -6.027 1.982 0.737
(0.382)** (0.663)** (0.187)** (0.297)*
Observations 1336 444 1336 444
R-squared 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.52
Sources: County level data from ICPSR 2896 - Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United
States, 1790-2000. Geographical information from ESRI GIS data. Average establishment size in 1977 from County
Business Patterns.
Log Change in Population,
1980-2000
Log Change in Median
Income, 1980-2000
Table 8:
Income and Population Growth Regressions, 1980-2000












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































63Nation 4.716 -0.556 1.523 1.329 0.729 3.757 0.444 -1.253 1.009 0.729
(0.853) (0.111) (0.517) (0.249) (0.573) (0.282) (0.061) (0.085) (0.096) (0.573)
East 4.855 -0.712 1.913 1.739 -0.361 4.65 -0.293 0.638 1.728 -0.361
(2.551) (0.333) (1.312) (0.701) (1.212) (0.409) (0.116) (0.166) (0.136) (1.212)
Midwest 3.647 -0.475 1.534 1.022 0.582 3.711 -0.469 1.478 1.092 0.582
(1.027) (0.143) (0.462) (0.317) (0.747) (0.337) (0.079) (0.095) (0.112) (0.747)
South 6.531 -0.551 4.108 1.293 2.652 6.366 -0.258 3.225 1.276 2.652
(1.702) (0.207) (0.956) (0.461) (0.811) (0.304) (0.075) (0.091) (0.099) (0.811)
West 4.883 -0.687 -1.466 1.889 -0.784 1.785 0.531 -3.717 0.91 -0.784
(1.846) (0.215) (1.114) (0.531) (1.22) (0.341) (0.099) (0.135) (0.117) (1.22)
Notes:
(1) MSA-level coefficients are from Table 9. Individual-level coefficients are from Table 10.
(2) Values used were σ=4 and μ=.7. See section III for formulas.
Table 11:
Estimated Coefficients
MSA-level Coefficients Individual-level Coefficients
64